Playing Devil’s Advocate for Satan by Dr. Dennis Cooley
Much philosophical time and energy have been devoted to examining the nature of God. On the other hand, Satan’s nature has received comparatively little attention even though it poses serious problems for some contemporary Christian beliefs. I argue if Satan is completely evil, as many of today’s Christian laypersons believe, then he must be more powerful than God himself. The only way out of this undesirable conclusion is for Satan to be good in some way.
Perhaps because he receives much better press, the nature of God1has been the subject of a plethora of articles and books. A great deal less work has been devoted to the subject of God’s archrival, Satan,2and in particular to his nature. Some contemporary Christian laypersons’ standard position is Satan3 is an entirely evil entity bent on the destruction of man’s relationship with God.4 The Devil will do anything, it is thought, to tempt humans into eternal damnation in the mistaken belief it will help him and his minions to eventually overthrow God and his host5.
I believe some contemporary Christians make serious errors in their characterization of Satan as a completely evil being. I will not consider the ontological difficulties entailed in the claim The Devil and an omnipotent, omni-benevolent entity exist at the same time. Rather I will focus my attention on whether or not it is intelligible to say Satan, if he should exist, is motivated only by evil or intends evil purely for its own sake. A strong case can be made adopting this view forces us to commit heresy.
In this paper, I will examine Lucifer’s intentions and motivations in light of different definitions of evil. If evil is simply a privation of good, as Saint Augustine and others claim, then it is impossible for Satan’s intentions to be for evil in, and of, itself, or for him to be motivated by evil alone. However, if evil is pain or sin, the possibilities for the Devil’s intentions double. Once again, Satan may not be able to intend pure evil provided his reasoning is similar enough to human beings. On the other hand, if Satan can intend evil for evil’s sake, then his mental processes become unintelligible to us and his powers prove greater than God’s. After all, if God really is either the source of morality or bound by moral law, then he would not be able to do what is evil, while the Devil can.
The Definition of Evil
Prior to examining Christianity’s position on Satan’s motivations, it will be useful to consider the Apocryphal Book, Enoch, which contains the only account of the fall of the rebellious angels. According to Enoch’s writer, a group of angels lusted after the daughters of men, rejected heaven, and fell.6 These fallen angels taught men the arts, science, and vice. Satan desired equal power to God, thereby rejecting good and causing himself to be cast out of heaven because of his pride.7 (O’Grady, p. 8.)
In this account, Lucifer’s reasons for his actions were morally inadequate yet comprehensible to humans. He decided shared governance was the way the universe ought to be run, and he should be one of the people in control. By choosing self-aggrandizement over the will of God, Satan committed an evil act required the severe punishment of banishment from God. But was the Devil’s intention solely toward evil in and of itself or was it toward something else?
At certain times in the Church’s history, Satan’s actual motivations for action were seen to be good. In the Middle Ages, for example, the Church Fathers argued evil is the privation of good, i.e., good is something, while evil is nothing. St. Anselm claimed “No one wills evil, as evil is nothing in itself. But a lesser good can be willed. The Devil willed the good of his own happiness instead of the justice of God’s Cosmos.” (Ibid., p. 37)8
According to the medieval theologian’s position, in order to will something to be done, an agent must will something to come about. Even if he wants nothing to be done, what the agent actually wills is the status quo. To will nothing is impossible; it requires us to focus literally on nothing. Our minds have to have some intentional object on which to concentrate and help coordinate our actions; thus, no one can will something purely because it is evil. It is to will nothing as nothing. If Anselm and others like him are correct, then Satan cannot be all bad; it is incoherent to think otherwise.
There is good reason to reject the definition of evil as the privation of goodness. The definition makes sense only if an Aristotelian physics and ethics is accepted. In this system, every entity has a function, which it more or less fulfills. The function of a hammer, for instance, is to hammer. If it fulfills its function well, then it is a good hammer, but if it does not-perhaps it is fragile-then it is a bad hammer. People have the function of having a good or happy life. (Nicomachean Ethics, 1097b-98a) To achieve this end, they must develop and use their theoretical reasoning to a great extent. (Ibid., 1103a) People can be judged as good or bad based solely upon their souls’ “conformity with the best and most complete” excellences. (Ibid, 1098a) Those with higher levels of conformity are better than those with lower levels. If someone does not conform at all, then he is totally evil. On the other hand, complete conformity entails total goodness. God, of course, perfectly fulfills his self-imposed functions; hence, He is a perfect being.
A severe problem with defining evil as the absence of goodness should now become clearer. Some entities, e.g., rocks on Mars, do not have a function.9 They merely exist. The only way they could have a function would be if they could self-impose an end upon themselves the way human persons can, or have one imposed from without, as has happened to the rock holding open my door. In the case of rocks on Mars, it is clear neither has occurred. Following this line of thought, if Martian rocks have no function, then they must be evil. Since goodness only exists to the percentage an entity is fulfilling its function, and there are entities without function, the objects cannot be good. Given evil is the privation of goodness, it follows that not only are these objects evil, they are totally evil by necessity.
By this time, it should be clear the privation definition of evil is defective. Attempting to classify rocks on Mars as good or evil makes as much sense as trying to figure out how much “rockness” a person has. Aristotelian function physics do not recognize some properties are primarily conceptual rather than gradational. For instance, women can be pregnant or not, but there is no such thing as being a little bit pregnant. All concept properites share the same feature: an object has the property or not, with no in-betweens. That is, if the concept applies, it is instantiated by the object. If it does not, then the object does not instantiate the concept. There is no such thing as a partial instantiation.
Evil and goodness work in much the same way, with one qualification. In order to evaluate an object, action, thought or thing, we must first ask ourselves if the entity instantiates good or evil. That is, does it make any sense to talk about the object in terms of moral goodness or evil? In the case of the Martian rock, it does not, and we can stop at that stage. In other situations, after determining at least one of the two concepts applies, we then can ask if the entity is better or worse without referencing the other concept in any way. Suppose we must choose between two morally right actions, and neither action is evil in any way. Unless some ideal maximization normative principle is being used, although each action is morally right, it makes sense to talk about which action is better, worse or equally good.10 For example, one action could be better because it has more intrinsic goodness than the other. However, the fact the latter is worse than the former does not entail it is more evil than the latter, it merely does not have as much goodness. The point is evil and goodness are not intimately linked as the ancients and medievals would have us believe. Evil is not the absence of goodness because we can talk about one without reference to the other. Hence, the privation definition of evil is wrong. 11
Unlike their medieval counterparts, most contemporary Christians consider evil to be pain or sin rather than a privation of the good. The reason pain is evil is intuitively obvious when we consider examples such as a fawn with a leg broken by non-human causes. The pain it suffers clearly is intrinsically disvaluable. If something is in pain, then its being in pain is bad in and of itself. Though the suffering may be good as a means, e.g., it may act as a warning if we go further there will be more dire consequences to follow, it cannot be good in and of itself.
Sin, whether or not it is the refusal of God’s will, is evil as well. When an agent sins, he does something proscribed by the moral rule governing the situation. Sinning includes not only wrong actions but immoral intentions, motives, and thoughts as well. Each time an agent instantiates one of these things, he has done something morally forbidden.12
The contemporary Christian must therefore think if Satan is pure evil, he must never have a good thought or do a good deed.13 He must always be sinning, causing pain for evil’s own sake, or doing evil without any good being instantiated as means or ends. So, according to this line of reasoning, a purely evil entity can never do anything moral, such as having a good intention or motive.
The Historical Christian View of Satan
The problem the contemporary Christian layperson faces is justifying the conclusion Satan is not good in any way. In this section, I will first argue the Bible does not show Satan as a purely evil creature. Secondly, even if the Christian should happen to use the church dogma has evolved over the centuries, he still runs the risk of heresy. Maintaining the position Satan is all evil either leads to an impossibility or to the conclusion God is weaker than The Devil.
The Bible does not support the position Satan is evil in himself. Consider, for instance, one book of the Old Testament is commonly thought to be about Satan’s perfidy. In Job, we see Satan is not all bad. In fact, he is in the employ of God himself, striding the earth and testing people’s faith in the divine being.
One day the heavenly beings came to present themselves before the Lord, and Satan also came among them….The Lord said to Satan, “Have you considered my servant Job? There is no one like him on earth, a blameless and upright man who fears God and turns away from evil.” Then Satan answered the Lord. “Does Job fear God for nothing? Have you not put a fence around him and his house and all that he has, on every side? You have blessed the work of his hands, and his possessions have increased in the land. But stretch out your hand now and touch all that he has, and he will curse you to your face.” The Lord said to Satan, “Very well, all that he has is in your power; only do not stretch out your hand against him!” (Job, 1:6-12)
The proximity of the participants and tone of the conversation do not support the view God and Satan were at this time dire enemies. In this passage, there is no antagonism present between the two as there would have been had there been a falling out between them.
Secondly, Satan has to ask God for permission to try Job, which would be odd indeed if they were actually antagonists. Satan, if he always behaved evilly, as the contemporary Christian contends, would certainly harm Job without seeking God’s sanction.
By obtaining God’s consent, Satan has in effect done what is good; he has obeyed God. All Christians believe if God approves of certain actions, then they must be moral for one of two reasons: either God makes them moral by divine will or God approves of them because they are good. Regardless of which alternative is true, if either, the actions must be right. Based on this, it is clear the correct reading of the passage is the future New Testament’s Evil One is acting subserviently to his master.
Furthermore, the fact Satan uses the power of God to destroy all of Job’s possessions, family, and health proves God approved of what Satan was doing. (Job 6:15-19, 2:7) God, in effect, aided and abetted The Adversary in the latter’s work. In these passages, though Lucifer’s actions may initially appear to be evil, they are not. God’s sanction shows them to be right.
The passages from Job are also illustrative of another reason why the actions of killing Job’s children and destroying his fortune are moral. Satan’s actions are efficient means to a good end. Job is being tested to see if he is worthy of God’s beneficence. Because Job is pleasing in the sight of God, he is greatly rewarded. Job not only receives twice the monetary wealth he lost, he also has seven more sons and three more daughters. (Job 42:13) The amount of livestock, the property of the daughters and the wealth of the children’s progeny are extensive-sure signs of favor in God’s eyes.
Though the pain and suffering Job had to endure was evil in and of itself, the value of the overall state of affairs was very good. The evil Satan caused was merely a necessary means for achieving the good end. The evil was necessary in order to prove Job really was worthy of God’s attention and his subsequent rewards.14
Surprisingly, even in the New Testament, the Devil’s motivations are not evil in themselves. Consider Luke’s version of Jesus’ forty days of being tested. Satan uses the false values of earthly power, wealth, and a satisfaction of earthly desires in the process. (Luke 4:1-13) When Satan threatens to throw him off the pinnacle of the temple in Jerusalem, for example, Jesus is asked to choose between life and death. He could demonstrate pridefully his power by calling for angels’ assistance to save himself, which would have been evil in the sight of God. Or he could plummet to his death on the ground below. By choosing not to summon divine assistance, Jesus avoids succumbing to temptation, thereby proving himself worthy of being the son of God.15
However, though the evil values Satan tempts Jesus with may be bad in and of themselves, what is his purpose in testing Jesus in the first place? Why does the Devil want him to fail? The obvious answer is if Jesus should yield to temptation, then Satan would gain a very powerful ally- or at very least eliminate an opponent- at the same time he eliminates the chance of redemption for all of mankind.
There are two options for why the Devil would want to eliminate the threat Jesus poses, i.e., his motives and intentions behind the temptation. First, Satan may think the ends he is trying to bring about are good in some way. Or secondly, he may believe they are evil in and of themselves.
The second option would be unintelligible to us as human persons. Such philosophers as Plato, Aristotle, and Kant claimed people can never do anything merely because it is evil in and of itself. Rather, we act in the way we do because we think it is good. Marcus Aurelius writes:
Today I shall be meeting with interference, ingratitude, insolence, disloyalty, ill will, and selfishness-all of them due to the offender’s ignorance of what is good or evil. But for my part I have long perceived the nature of the good and its nobility, the nature of evil and its meanness… (Aurelius, 2:1, p.45)
Evil is an error in judgment due to a lack of knowledge.16 According to this line of reasoning, people will never make moral mistakes if they have a sufficient amount of information and adequately functioning reasoning processes.
Jesus says much the same thing when he is questioned about the wisdom of returning to Judea and the possibility of being stoned. “Are there not twelve hours of daylight? Those who walk during the day do not stumble because they see by the light of this world. But those who walk at night stumble, because the light is not in them” (John 11:9-10) Ignorant people will remain in the dark and stumble into sin, but those who have acquired the proper knowledge will not make such moral mistakes. Knowledge lights their pathway no matter what their situation is.
In order to deceive people into making moral mistakes, thus, Satan must turn everything upside down. More precisely, he makes people think good is bad and bad is good. In John 8:4417, he is characterized as someone who:
[abides] not in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own; for he is a liar and the father of it.
In order to be a liar, the Devil must think he knows the truth of some propositions. He has to be able to make a person think good is bad and vice versa; hence, he must have some idea of what good really is. To deceive, the Father of Lies must make a person think not p when p.
In the New Testament, the power of Satan resides in his ability to convince people good is bad and bad is good. He confuses people about what is true, thereby, impairing their ability to make moral choices. Once again, it is evident the Bible has adopted the position people will not do evil merely because it is evil. They have to think the evil is good. Satan cannot convince people to do evil for its own sake; he has to dress it up in respectability and goodness to make it a viable alternative for human persons.
The atrocities of which man is capable of committing are not in themselves sufficient to defeat my moral mistake argument. In every atrocity the perpetrator(s) was making a tremendous moral mistake but not doing evil for its own sake. Even the most horrible crimes performed were done in order to achieve what the agent thought was some good end. Hitler, for example, thought it was good to exterminate any person considered to be subhuman so the mythical Aryan race could be protected. In this, he was terribly wrong, but he did it for what he perceived of as the good.
The only real evidence I can give for this position is empirical study of how humans go about trying to live a moral life. Never does anyone ever say “I did X purely because it was evil.” Instead, each person will, if pressed, justify the action on other some sort of moral grounds. One of my students, for example, said she had killed a frog just to do something bad. When asked the circumstances surrounding the act, she replied she had done it to impress some girls who belonged to a clique she wanted to join. The actual reason was not really to do evil; rather, it was to try to belong. This she mistakenly thought killing a harmless amphibian was morally right in this situation.
No human person, thus, ever commits a crime or does anything wrong because it is evil. In fact, it is beyond our comprehension to think how one could be motivated purely by evil. Anytime we act in one way rather than another, there must be a good reason for choosing it over the alternatives. It is incomprehensible for someone to perform an action with only what they perceive of as evil reasons when he knows there is an alternative with at least one morally good reason to do it.
We are faced with two alternatives at this juncture. First, if Satan acts purely out of the desire to do evil- and the Bible does not seem to support this view18-he would be acting unintelligibly to us. Thus, Satan and God may be both unintelligible to us, since comprehension of entities with powers for which we have no reference are beyond the grasp of our weaker minds.
Second, if Satan is restricted by the same constraints we have on our actions and minds, then he must act for what he perceives of as the good. I am not saying it really is the good, but his motivation and intentions are toward doing something good. The Devil’s intentions and motivations thereby become understandable to us.
The Problem of Being Pure Evil
The ramifications of adopting the alternative Satan acts for evil’s own sake are problematic for the standard Judeo-Christian view of God.The dilemma posed by Socrates in The Euthyphro helps to shed light on the consequences of blindly accepting Satan’s intentions are evil in themselves. Socrates tries to determine if it makes sense to base morality on divine commands. Basically he asks his audience whether God’s will alone makes something right or good or does God command something because it is right or good independently of him? At the end of the dialogue, Socrates concludes God approves of things becausethey are good, rather than God’s approval making them good.
The dilemma also poses more serious difficulties for the thesis the Evil One’s actions are motivated by evil for evil’s sake. In either case, Satan proves to be more powerful than God. He is able to choose to do evil when God cannot.
Suppose an act is right if, and only if God commands it. Purely by will, God makes things moral or not. In this case, Satan, then, is more powerful than God. If whatever God wills is ipso fact moral, then he can never will to do something wrong. It would be an impossible case of God going directly against his own will, which will work, in a sense, only if God is schizophrenic. Satan has the option of choosing to do something moral or immoral, which is not available to God.19 Since making Satan’s will more powerful than God’s is not acceptable to the contemporary Christian’s notions of the all powerful, good, present, and knowing divine entity, morality must be independent of God’s will.
Suppose next God commands an act if, and only if, the act is classified as moral by the correct independent principle. It need not concern us what this principle is, merely there is one. There are two alternative interpretations to this supposition. First, God commands the act because he must do so. In this interpretation, an essential characteristic of God’s nature is he is good, which means God is in effect programmed to act rightly. If it is part of God’s essence he compelled to command an act, then he cannot have the ability to choose to do otherwise. Once again, God has no free will.
It follows Satan is more powerful than God, because the Devil can choose to do evil or good, is what landed him in trouble in the first place. Since the first supposition was rejected on the basis of its unwarranted limitation of God’s power, for consistency’s sake this alternative must be rejected as well.
Though it may look more plausible, the second alternative fares no better than the first. If God does not create morality through divine will, then he must be bound by an independent moral principle, but, he can still choose to do either good or evil. Initially, this seems to make his freedom on par with Satan’s; both entities have equal free will. However, in this alternative, Satan is able to choose evil for its own sake, thereby making him a greater power than God.
God will always choose the good or right because it is good or right. But why does God choose morality over alternatives that are evil? God is capable of weighing the alternatives. He is not compelled to choose good over evil. So, why does he always choose good? The answer must be God perceives the good, and perception in conjunction with his personality lead God to choose the good. He does not have to, but he will always do so.
It follows there must be some motivating factor in the good contributes to the overall choice for God. There would be no reason to choose good over evil, if no such impetuous exists. In order for an agent to do X, he must desire to do X in some way. Without motivation, no one would ever do anything. If we do not care either way, we would not be able to choose between the pricking of a finger or the destruction of the world; there is an inadequate impetuous to choose or do either. Since there would not be anything favored one option over the other in the decision process, God would have to make choices by flipping a coin or some other random decision procedure.20
On the other hand, Satan can pick either good or evil actions. Recall, Satan was an angel at one time, so he must have been able to choose the good. Selecting the good must still be an option to him, otherwise, he becomes an automaton and cannot be a moral agent. He would be compelled to do evil, and God would have unfairly cast him out of heaven. God’s actions would be analogous to kicking a dog for barking, except with more severe consequences.
If the Devil is able to choose evil for evil’s sake, then he must perceive something in the evil that motivates him to take that alternative. Once again, if there are no relevant justificatory differences in the options, then there is no reason to prefer one over the others. The fact Satan does make these choices through a rational decision procedure entails he has greater knowledge than God. God cannot perceive these motivating factors; thus, God cannot be all knowing. In this respect, Lucifer is mentally greater than God. Again, we encounter an unacceptable conclusion if we want to maintain the Judeo-Christian version of the Divine Being.
Given the insurmountable difficulties for the contemporary Christian layperson entailed by the claim Satan is motivated or intends evil for evil’s own sake, the most plausible solution is Satan is merely a misguided being who does evil because of ignorance of what is good and bad. We can maintain the standard Judeo-Christian version of God and still have an understandable notion of the Devil. What makes the adoption of this position even more tempting is the fact there is a chance for redemption even for Satan. All he has to do is to obtain sufficient knowledge to guide him to the truth. What is more Christian than accept the chance one’s greatest enemy can be redeemed and hope it occurs?
Aristotle, (1) Ethica Nicomachea W.D. Ross trans. in The Basic Works of Aristotle,Richard McKeon ed. (Random House: New York, NY, 1941): 935-1126. (2) Physica R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye trans. in The Basic Works of Aristotle, Richard McKeon ed. (Random House: New York, NY, 1941): 218-397.
Aurelius, Marcus, Meditations, Maxwell Staniforth (trans.), ((New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1964).
Carus, Paul. The History of the Devil and the Idea of Evil, (New York: Gramercy Books, 1996).
Good News Bible, (New York: American Bible Society, 1976).
Holy Bible, The New Revised Standard Version, (Iowa Falls, Iowa: World Bible Publishers, Inc., 1989).
Levy, Leonard W. Blasphemy, (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995).
New World Bible Translation Committee, New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures, (Brooklyn, NY: Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., 1961)
Mercatante, Anthony S. Good and Evil in Myth & Legend, (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1978).
Milton, John. Paradise Lost,Peter Weston, ed., (New York: Penguin Books, 1987).
O’Grady, Joan. The Prince of Darkness, (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1989).
Plantinga, Alvin, ed. (1)The Ontological Argument, (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1965). (2)God and Other Minds, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967).
Ramm, Bernard. The Devil, Seven Wormwoods, and God, (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1977).
Smith, Huston. The Religions of Man, 1st edition, (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1958).
1 Throughout this paper I will be assuming the standard Judeo-Christian view of God as an omnipotent, omni-benevolent, omnipresent, and omniscient entity.
2 I’d like to thank Susan Greene Osgood for her help with the title of this paper.
3 In Hebrew, “Satan” means Adversary.
4 Though many theologians and members of the various denomination’s hierarchies do not hold this view, most lay members do. It is their misconception I am addressing in this paper.
5 In Islam, Satan knows he will lose in the end, but asks God to allow him to tempt people until time.
6 It is not until much later, after the Gospels were written, Satan became the leader of this group. Origen writes Lucifer fell because he desired to put his will in the place of God’s. Sin, thus, is the rejection of God’s will.
7 In the Koran, Satan’s fall is the result of his refusal to bow down before Adam. In either account the cause of Satan’s sin is pride and the refusal of passions to bow before reason.
8 St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas hold similar views about the definition of evil.
9 There will be those who claim everything has a function given by God, although we might not know what the function is. In response to the assertion, it is sufficient to point out randomness exists in the universe-see quantum physics and the Heisenberg experiment. The burden of proof then shifts to those who would claim universal functions given by God to prove their claim, which given the size of the universe, would be an impossible task-and one loaded with hubris for believing anyone can know what God is doing.
10 Even maximization consequentialists separate evil and goodness in their calculations. For standard act utilitarianism, for example, utility is found by subtracting all the evil produced by an action from all of the good produced by the action. If evil was merely the absence of goodness, then finding one would tell us what percentage is left over for the other.
11 One argument I have heard against the Problem of Evil argument is based on this definition of evil. An analogy is made that good and evil are analogous to brightness and darkness. A light can be brighter or darker according to how much light it is producing at a certain time. Darkness is merely the absence of light.
However, the argument is suspect. First, good and evil are moral terms, while brightness and darkness are completely different. The latter would exist even if people and sentient creatures did not. Second, and more importantly, in order to have brightness, we must have light or dark first. That is, there are conceptual properites that must exist prior to our being able to explain brightness or darkness. Hence, even these terms assume conceptual properties as did the ancients and medievals when they developed their definition of evil.
12 Built into the definition of sin is personhood or moral agency. In order to sin, a creature must know, or at least have good reason to believe, what she is doing is bad. That is, she must have moral standards and be able to apply them in the particular situation. Since organic and inorganic material, small children, and most animals cannot weigh alternatives in light of moral codes and make reasoned decisions on what the agent ought to do, they are not moral agents.
13 It would be nonsensical to claim Satan is identical to pain. Satan must have the ability to choose to do wrong actions, simple basic feelings cannot do this.
14 Origen and St Augustine thought the work of the devil was a part of God’s greater scheme for humanity and the universe.
15 Two alternative interpretations are Jesus would have been corrupted by the flesh. Or he is merely showing the world he is above temptation of the flesh, thereby establishing his divinity. For the purposes of this paper, the true interpretation is irrelevant. It is sufficient to note in each, evil is used to achieve some good goal.
16 See Meditations 2:7 for Aurelius’s view of the matter.
17 Also, see Peter 3:7, for example.
18 Here is a listing of the different Biblical references to Satan by one or another of his names.
BEELZEBUB, Mt 10:25; 12:24; Mr 3:22. (New World Translation, p. 1347)
DEVIL, Joh 8:44 from your father the D.
Eph 4:27 neither allow place for the D.
Eph 6:11 stand firm against the D.
Heb 2:14 he might bring to nothing the D.
Jas 4:7 but oppose the D., and he will
1Pe 5:8 Your adversary, the D, walks
1Jo 3:8 D. has been sinning from beginning
1Jo 3:8 to break up the works of the D.
Re 12:12 because the D. has come down to
Re 20:2 who is the D. and Satan, and bound
Mt 4:1, 8; 25:41; Joh 13:2; Jude 9. (Ibid., p. 1361)
SATAN, 1Ch 21:1 S. incite David to number
Job 1:6 S. proceeded to come in right among
Job 2:2 S. answered Jehovah and said: “From
Zec 3:1 S. standing at his right to resist
Mt 12:26 if S. expels S., he has become
Mt 16:23 Get behind me, S.!
Mr 1:13 forty days, being tempted by S.,
Lu 10:18 behold S. already fallen from
Lu 22:3 S. entered into Judas, the one
Ro 16:20 God will crush S. under your feet
1Co 5:5 hand such a man over to S. for
2Co 2:11 may not be overreached by S., for we
2Co 11:14 S. keeps transforming himself into
2Co 12:7 thorn in the flesh, an angel of S.,
1Th 2:18 but S. cut across our path.
Re 2:9 they are a synagogue of S.
Re 12:9 serpent, one called Devil and S.,
Re 20:2 S., and bound him a thousand
Re 20:7 S. will be let loose out of his
Mt 4:10; Mr 4:15; Ac 26:18; 2Th 2:9. (Ibid., p. 1417)
SHINING ONE, Isa 14:12 fallen you s. (Ibid., p. 1422)
19 Kant makes a distinction between human will and divine will. It does not concern Kant that God cannot make a choice to act morally or not, but it should worry us. If God cannot choose to do evil, then how can he really be a moral agent? God would be on the same level, in this regard, as cats and dogs.
20 Making decisions in this way would also require a choice and desire.